Friday, July 29, 2011

THIRTEEN YEARS



Mulla habia adquirido fama de ser el hombre mas sabio de todo el pais. Cierto dia un campesino fue a visitarlo, pues siempre habia tenido deseos de conocerlo en persona. Antes de tocar a la puerta del maestro, se limpio los pies, se arreglo la ropa y acomodo muy bien la canasta en la que llevaba un magnifico pato para regalarselo a Mulla. Este se sintio muy honrado de recibir al campesino, lo invito a comer y a pasar la noche en su casa.

A la mañana siguiente, el campesino se despidió y le dijo a Mulla que recordaría ese día como el más feliz de su vida.

Varios días más tarde, unos jovencitos llamaron a la puerta del sabio y dijeron que eran los hijos del campesino que unos días antes le había regalado un pato. De inmediato, Mulla los invitó a pasar, un poco sorprendido. Platicaron, comieron y se despidieron todos muy felices.

Una semana despues, dos hombres llamaron nuevamente a la puerta del sabio.
_ ?Quienes son ustedes?
_ Somos vecinos del hombre que le regalo el pato.

Para ese entonces, Mulla comenzaba a sentirse un poco incomodo, porque el pato habia resultado un regalo muy comprometedor. Sin embargo, puso al mal tiempo buena cara e invito a comer a los recien llegados.




Alejandro Jodorowsky, "la sopa de pato", en la sabiduria de los chistes. Mexico, Grijalbo, 1997, p.366. (Tomado de asi hablamos, intermedio 1, CEPE-UNAM)

Sorry, por la ortografia, pero estoy encima de la coreana, la lap, compas, la portatil. So, no accents, mates.

No, no es aqui, donde se nos esta cayendo el cielo. Vaya, que han aguantado muy bien el diluvio en la capirucha, sin tanto pancho. Solo les encargo una tarea: ?es mi percepcion personal o es que estamos observando en 2011, que llueve mas en el norte que en el sur del defectuoso? Ahi me avisan.



Now, si estan pensando que el post ha de tratarse sobre ese jolgorio, al que no nos invitaron, en el penal de juaritos, entonces estan pero si bien... equivocados.

Justo antes de que estamos listo pa agarrar... carretera, me avisan que hay cambio de ultima hora, una de nuestras anfitrionas quiere darme un recuerdito antes de partir. Entonces era cierto, una de sus hijas, se ha perdido nuestro performance, con el fin de preparar las mejores tostadas de maiz que he probado.

Menos recientes son las técnicas que debo recibir pa´no andar por ahí divulgando ideas exóticas con respecto a la chamba. How long since I´ve seen this for the very first time? Ojalá se utilizaran para internacionalizar la justicia y la distribución equitativa de la riqueza; pero sí es cierto lo que las cifras (no maquilladas) nos dicen, los únicos que se beneficiaron con estas modernas formas de abordar lo laboral son, as always, those who really did not need it that much. No es tiempo pa quejarse, y sigo absorbiendo las supuestas enseñanzas, mientras pienso en cuanto ha de aumentar la eficiencia de estos compadres, básicamente organizados en clusters de acuerdo a su percepción semanal, días después he de enterarme que, este patio no es particular: un subordinado ha de ser despedido por el viceroy local, por la simple y sencilla razón de recklessly expresar su opinión. Well, as in my weekdays job, a apechugar a lo que dice el contrato, mientras las condiciones podemos cambiar (algo que los ignorantes revisionistas históricos usualmente desconocen o pretenden no recordar, es que muchos de esos gigantes de la teoría rojilla, por razones diversas, tuvieron que dentro del sistema jalar). For the time being, no waves here, please.


Not so long ago, por puro gusto y compromiso tambien, asisti a un seminario de una colega del tema de los dias de semana (los fines, its a slightly different; right, companero?). Interesting, indeed. These days, there is a brand new hypothesis in store: we, the citizens in our lovely continent (and the rest -http://marcosalas.blogspot.com/2011/07/west-and-rest-o-el-mito-de-la-comunidad.html-, underdeveloped) are not only threaten by the unexpected (and impossible to forecast completely, yet; no matter for some its so hard to accept), but also by the widespread corruption of our politicias (and all those working in our public services) as well. Quite right, but not entirely true, Im afraid, myth. En los proximos teclazos me propongo demostrarles (sin condescendencia barata, http://siempremujer.com/cultura/manana-o-pasado-el-misterio-de-los-mexicanos-de-jorge-g-castaneda/7701/), los bemoles, los recovecos, los matices de esta suposicion.

Existen caminos sinuosos mas dificiles de entender.

_ ?Que pasa con ese chamaco? -le pregunto a mi mujer. Esta mucho mas calmado que los otros.

_ Le duele mucho la cabeza, me dijo su mamá -me contesta la oriental.

_ !Ah, pus pa pronto lo arreglamos! -le digo mas que sobrado. Y me lanzo al coche a buscar mi dotacion personal de painkillers.

_ ?Y eso? -me inquiere extranada, la de la penininsula coreana.

_ Aqui tiene, nomas porque no traigo mas, pero creo que con esos tiene pa que se le quite el dolor -le doy las instrucciones a la mama del chiquillo.

Al dia siguiente, me doy cuenta que a quien no le voy a quitar su mercado, es a mi carnal.

_ ?Ya se le quito? -le pregunto otra vez, muy ufano, a la mamá.

_ Pues ya no tiene dolor de cabeza, pero la calentura, esa, poquito se le quito -me contesta resignada.

_ Mmm -y dale la burra al trigo, compa, ni que fuera de tu canton. ?Sabes que, babe? A mi se me hace que a este chavito es otra cosa lo que le falto.

_ ?A donde vas, Marco? -me grita la chinita todavia no acostumbrada a mis arranques.

_ Aqui tiene, mi estimada. Que se tome todas estas (suplementos vitamicos, que mi cuidadosa mujer, pone en mi mochila cada fin) hasta acabar.

Esta vez el diagnostico es certero.

_ A ver, que pase el destemplado -digo, mientras toco la frente del desnutrido. Mmm, ahora sí estás bien, papá.

Días después, conozco a quien le brinda mayor atención.

Una discapacitada, semiparalizada adolescente, intenta divertirse, mientras realiza esfuerzos titánicos, con los globos como todos los demás de su edad.

_ Antes que me juntara con ellos era peor, namas se arrastraba. Ahora ella solita camina hasta desde la entrada sin protestar -nos dice mientras imaginamos a esta nena, lastimosamente caminando por la carretera bajo el inclemente sol.

Yo, sin embargo, imagino el patrón. Y a pesar de ello, me atrevo a preguntar.

_ ?Y qué le pasó?

_ Pus, es que cuando bien chiquilla, la calentura le pegó, y así me la dejó.

_ No hay médico en el pueblo -se me sale una de esas impertinentes preguntas que todos ustedes conocen ya.

_ No, aquí, no -me contesta con la mirada clavada al suelo.

_ Tonz, ?por aqui no pasan camiones pa ir al hospital? -vuelo imprudentemente a preguntar.

_ No, pero si queremos ir al hospital, pues a un taxi $300 tenemos que pagar.


Y dada la anterior informacion, creo que poco tengo que agregar.



con
Describing the fcuking conditions of that woman in Oaxaca

Entrevista con Campa

A ver que inventamos pa terminarlo chido

how does it feel to be loved, finally?

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gS08ewErgo, Last Chance Harvey Official Movie HD Trailer)


MARKesO_Oaxaca;

Miahuatlan de Porfirio Diaz, Oaxaca;
http://www.iih.unam.mx/moderna/ehmc/ehmc02/012.html

29/07/11



SPECIAL REQUESTS:

Green Roof (Recycling dog fouling).

Oigan compas, desde la azotea de su Canton, me he dado cuenta de que, hay un monton de camaradas en cuatro, perdon, de cuatro patas en los techos; como supongo que de alguna manera tendran que aliviar sus necesidades. ?Que tal y si recolectamos sus valiosos excedentes organicos pa nuestros green purposes? Si, ya sé, que primero hay que encontrar valientes recolectores.

http://www.rochdale.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=2151



The Thirteenth Year (part one)

Wednesday, July 27, 2011


The west and the rest o el mito de la comunidad internacional

La intervención militar en Libia empezada hace más de un mes tiene como fundamento jurídico la resolución 1973 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, y como fundamento moral la responsabilidad de proteger a la población civil víctima de la represión del gobierno de Kadafi. Como en ocasiones anteriores, algunas grandes potencias del mundo –Estados Unidos, Francia, Gran Bretaña– toman la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad que promovieron con el apoyo de países de la Liga Árabe, como la expresión de la voluntad de la comunidad internacional. La resolución fue adoptada gracias a la abstención de dos miembros permanentes con derecho de veto, Rusia y China. En la práctica actual de Naciones Unidas, el uso del veto es muy poco frecuente, los miembros permanentes (con excepción de Estados Unidos) prefieren ponerse de acuerdo en fórmulas ambiguas que se prestan a diversas interpretaciones y a ser acusados de paralizar el sistema multilateral con su veto. Rusia y China no estaban de acuerdo con la intervención, y lo hicieron saber con toda claridad, pero por considerar que sus intereses vitales no estaban en juego, dejaron a los promotores del proyecto, Estados Unidos, Francia y Gran Bretaña, lanzarse en esta aventura militar cuyo resultado es cada día mas imprevisible y suscita reticencias, reservas y oposiciones crecientes en todo el mundo. Los tres países, que encabezan lo que algunos llaman una nueva cruzada de Occidente contra el mundo árabe, se sienten plenamente en su derecho para ejercer en Libia su responsabilidad de proteger. Como la ONU no tiene capacidad militar propia y no se trata de una operación de mantenimiento de la paz en el marco de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas con el envío de cascos azules, la OTAN se propuso como brazo armado de la comunidad internacional para implementar la zona de exclusión aérea y la ayuda humanitaria.

Vale la pena reflexionar sobre este concepto de comunidad internacional. La noción de comunidad expresa la idea de unidad, de intereses compartidos, de proyectos en común. Viendo la fragmentación del mundo contemporáneo debajo del barniz muy superficial de la globalización, ¿se puede realmente afirmar que los 192 países del planeta representan una comunidad? Desde el fin del mundo bipolar (1989) y los atentados de Nueva York (2001) los países occidentales, principalmente Estados Unidos, Canadá, la Unión Europea e Israel, lograron imponer su agenda al mundo entero (poniendo en primer lugar la lucha contra el terrorismo y la proliferación nuclear en lugar del Programa del milenio de lucha contra la pobreza), con el consentimiento (quien calla otorga) de sus ex rivales, Rusia, China, y de los grandes países emergentes, como Brasil, África del Sur, India, etcétera. Mediante los mecanismos formales de Naciones Unidas u otros como el Banco Mundial, el Fondo Monetario Internacional o la OCDE, o informales como el G7/8, G20 y tantos otros grupos fácticos ad hoc, el grupo occidental decide las prioridades del momento, buscando siempre conservar la iniciativa, aun cuando está dividido, para evitar la competencia de centros alternativos de poder. Los occidentales hacen caso omiso de las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, expresión de la voluntad de la mayoría de los países con igualdad de derechos. Tan es así que es muy común en los pasillos de las conferencias internacionales escuchar a los delegados de numerosos países explicar (en inglés, lingua franca internacional) que no existe una international community, porque el mundo está dividido en dos, The West and the rest, o sea, los países industrializados en su mayoría cristianos y blancos, contra el resto del mundo, una mezcla de razas, religiones, civilizaciones, que representan las tres cuartas partes de la humanidad. The West and the rest, fórmula inventada por el diplomático singapuriano Kishore Mahbunani es la clave que permite entender que, a pesar de todos los cambios que el mundo conoció en las ultimas décadas, estamos todavía muy lejos del mundo multipolar que muchos esperaban después del fin de la guerra fría.

Claro está que el bloque occidental tiene que hacer concesiones tácticas a los centros de poder emergentes para conservar el monopolio de las reglas del juego internacional. Por esto el G7 creó y legitimó el G20. Mientras países como Rusia, China, India, Brasil buscan sacar ventajas de la globalización, evitando confrontaciones violentas con los más poderosos, los países occidentales defienden sus intereses con todos los medios, y cada vez que es posible con la legitimación de la comunidad internacional. En una corrupción del lenguaje, este concepto utópico se confunde con occidente, como demuestra la crisis libia.

Haciendo una interpretación muy selectiva de la responsabilidad de proteger que le permite intervenir o no según sus intereses, el bloque occidental trata de retomar el control de la situación en los países de África del Norte y Medio Oriente inmersos en crisis sociales y económicas profundas, privilegiando según las circunstancias el statu quo (Arabia Saudita, Maruecos), cambios limitados o cosméticos (Egipto, Túnez) o rebeliones a control remoto (Libia). Pero detrás de las motivaciones humanitarias que todos compartimos, prevalecen los intereses geopolíticos y estratégicos de las grandes potencias sobre las aspiraciones de cambio político, económico y social de millones de personas que pretenden, con toda legitimidad, alcanzar los mismos niveles de bienestar que los países más desarrollados del mundo. Es obvio que actuar en nombre de una comunidad internacional inexistente permite a los países occidentales mantener una posición dominante conforme a sus intereses.




The west and the rest o el mito de la comunidad internacional

Pierre Charasse/II

La decisión de algunos países liderados por Francia y Gran Bretaña de intervenir en Libia para proteger a los civiles de las provincias orientales víctimas de la represión del régimen de Trípoli fue tomada aparentemente sin tener un conocimiento profundo de la situación interna. Los autores de este plan, en particular el presidente Sarkozy, estaban convencidos que después de 42 años en el poder, el régimen de Kadafi se podría caer en pocas semanas, a un costo relativamente bajo para los países dispuestos a intervenir. Cuatro meses después del inicio de la operaciones conducidas por Francia y Gran Bretaña bajo el paraguas de la OTAN y con una participación limitada de Estados Unidos, la realidad es otra: Kadafi esta todavía en el poder y no parece dispuesto a renunciar a pesar de los golpes recibidos y de la destrucción de una gran parte de su potencial militar. El gobierno francés tuvo que pedir al Parlamento una prórroga para continuar su despliegue militar y reconocer que a pesar de comunicados triunfalistas de la OTAN, la guerra en Libia es mucho mas complicada y costosa de lo que se preveía. Él pudo contar con el apoyo del Partido Socialista en la oposición, de una opinión pública convencida que es legítimo derrocar al régimen de Kadafi y de la indiferencia de la prensa, que prácticamente no habla de esta guerra.

Sin embargo, expertos franceses como el general (R) Vincent Desportes, ex director de la Escuela de Guerra, o el diplomático Patrick Haimzadeh, gran conocedor de Libia, divulgaron en días recientes en medios franceses análisis que no coinciden con las informaciones que dan tanto la OTAN como los gobiernos de los principales países participantes. Señalan en particular los puntos siguientes:

–Los objetivos de la intervención cambiaron desde el principio pasando de una misión humanitaria a la protección de los civiles al derrocamiento del régimen de Kadafi (en violación a la resolución 1973), provocando fuertes discusiones en la OTAN, en particular con Alemania e Italia: se trata ahora de una guerra civil con insurgentes armados y apoyados por fuerzas extranjeras contra un ejército regular con la presencia de mercenarios.

–Una parte solamente de la población libia se levantó contra Kadafi, quien goza del apoyo de varios grupos tribales leales; es muy difícil evaluar su nivel de popularidad en las diferentes regiones del país; la insurrección generalizada no se produjo.

–La OTAN no esperaba una resistencia tan fuerte del ejército libio y no tenía un "plan B" para enfrentar esta situación de estancamiento; la imposibilidad de mandar tropas terrestres y el recurso exclusivo a bombardeos aéreos hace muy difícil una victoria militar en el corto plazo, pero la OTAN no tiene otra opción que seguir bombardeando lo que queda de supuestos objetivos militares y tropas leales a Kadafi; los "daños colaterales" provocan el odio de la población de Trípoli contra Occidente.

–La OTAN sobrevaluó la capacidad militar y de organización de los insurrectos, especialmente fuera de los territorios que controlan (Cyrenaica, este del país). Tuvo que mandar agentes especiales para asesorar una fuerza militar improvisada y desorganizada; Francia envió armas a grupos presentes en el Djebel Nefousa, al oeste de Trípoli, para fomentar su insurrección contra el régimen.

–Los recursos desplegados por los países participantes no son suficientes para alcanzar rápidamente "el punto de inflexión estratégica", o sea el momento a partir del cual se considera que el derrumbe del régimen es inevitable. Las fuerzas involucradas (aviones, helicópteros, drones, barcos) están al límite de su capacidad y no podrán mantener mucho tiempo el mismo ritmo de operaciones; después de miles de salidas las municiones empiezan a escasear y los gobiernos ven con preocupación subir el costo de la intervención en el contexto de la crisis financiera europea y de las restricciones presupuestarias.

–La OTAN subestimó la voluntad de resistencia de Kadafi, y le cuesta entender que su formación, su cultura y su sicología de jefe tribal le prohíben abandonar a su pueblo estando en vida. El tiempo juega a favor de Kadafi.

–Si la caída del régimen de Kadafi parece inevitable a mediano plazo, en particular por la asfixia de la economía (o quizás su muerte), la OTAN y los principales países participantes se verán involucrados en un conflicto interno. El riesgo de división del pueblo libio es alto, así como de una partición territorial entre la Tripolitania y Cyrenaica, los vencedores serán percibidos por los vencidos como traidores e instrumentos de las potencias occidentales. El caos puede favorecer a grupos de Al Quaeda.

La única salida parece ser política. Las consultas entre todos los actores de esta crisis son intensas. Los rebeldes, conscientes de sus debilidades, tratan de no cortarse del resto del país y buscan ya la reconciliación nacional. Uno de los principales puntos en discusión es la suerte del líder libio, quien se encuentra acusado desde el 27 de junio por el Tribunal Penal Internacional de crímenes contra la humanidad. Obviamente él no se va entregar a la justicia internacional, y con esta acusación se cerró la posibilidad de una solución negociada con su participación.

Sin duda una de las principales lecciones de la crisis libia es que los países occidentales se metieron en una situación de la cual pueden salir muy debilitados. Si bien conservan todavía una gran capacidad de maniobra diplomática, su falta de resultados en el terreno militar revela al mundo que la OTAN no tiene los medios de su ambición de ser el "brazo armado" de la comunidad internacional. Después de las retiradas de Irak y de Afganistán sin victoria ni gloria, una semivictoria o un semifracaso en Libia podría constituir un giro en la recomposición del mundo, al mismo tiempo que el sistema económico y financiero dominado por Estados Unidos y Europa entró en una crisis sistémica duradera.

pcharasse@gmail.com

Tuesday, July 26, 2011


Why the UK must choose renewables over nuclear: an answer to Monbiot

Monbiot is fixed in a contrarian crusade to undermine the solar industry and his controversialist instincts have blinded him

• George Monbiot: Why must UK have to choose between nuclear and renewable energy?



A no entry sign outside Heysham Nuclear Power station in Morecambe, Lancashire
A no entry sign outside Heysham nuclear power station in Morecambe, Lancashire. Photograph: Christopher Thomond/Christopher Thomond

Why must the UK choose between nuclear and renewable energy? That was the question George Monbiot asked recently in a blog that challenged me to answer four questions. Here is a concise version of my answers: the full version of my answers will be posted on my website.

What has the Committee on Climate Change got wrong?

A lot. The principal source for the committee's estimates would appear to be Decc's own figures prepared for them by Mott MacDonald in June 2010. The assumptions on which this analysis is based are heroic, to put it mildly.

As pointed out by Andrew Broadbent (of CES Social and Economic Research), these figures have been challenged by a wide range of very different cost projections. Broadbent quotes the authoritative World Nuclear Status report which suggests that nuclear costs would be much higher, and that it is certainly not "the most cost-effective" low-carbon technology.

"Because of implicit and explicit guarantees, the private cost element of nuclear is uncertain and continues to escalate ... and the public subsidy portion is generally missing entirely, so that nuclear cannot be properly compared to alternatives, nor can the potentially enormous cost to taxpayers be properly vetted."

MacDonald produced a new report in May 2011 which pretty much contradicts its own 2010 report. As Broadbent points out:

"Its most important conclusion is that the relative costs of different energy-generating technologies actually depend on which technology is given priority by policy makers. The report says: 'It is possible to find cases where offshore wind, CCS and nuclear are each lower cost than the other two.'"

"This means that if renewables are deployed extensively, they may well be cheaper than nuclear. Why the committee came to airbrush this vital conclusion, and choose not to point out that government itself has the responsibility for deciding whether to make renewable energy the most cost-effective option, can only be guessed at."

This is not the place to go into the voluminous literature on hidden subsidies on nuclear power, but the committee makes only passing reference to perhaps the most egregious distortion: the indirect subsidy in the form of insurance liability.

In view of this, it is highly ironic that Vincent de Rivaz, CEO of EDF can regularly be heard calling for a "level playing field" for different energy sources, knowing full well that every other electricity supplier carries its own third-party liability costs.

Does Monbiot – or anyone, for that matter, on the Committee on Climate Change – actually understand the scale of this subsidy? Recent research by Versicherungsforen Leipzig GmbH (summary in English), a company that specialises in actuarial calculations, shows that full insurance against nuclear disasters would increase the price of nuclear electricity by a range of values - €0.14 per kilowatt hours (kWh) up to €2.36 per kWh – depending on assumptions made.

By the time you factor in all the hidden subsidies, the Committee on Climate Change's figure of £96 per megawatt hours has no more validity than any other competing estimate, and it is entirely disingenuous of the committee to put it in the public domain without making clear just how spurious the figure really is.

The Committee on Climate Change should really know better – as should Monbiot.

Predictably, investors know better. Which is why no reactor ever has been, or ever will be, built without massive public subsidy – a point readily conceded by most industry representatives.

Finally, the committee's estimate also makes no allowance for additional, post-Fukushima cost increases. Every energy economist I know acknowledges unreservedly that the cost of nuclear will continue to go up even as the cost of solar PV continues to come down. The World Nuclear Status report from Schneider, Froggatt & Thomas concludes: "Despite the disproportionately lower support historically, some analysts consider solar photovoltaic energy to be competitive with nuclear new-build projects under current real-term prices. ".

Monbiot has been unsighted on the costs of PV for a long time, . I hope he has now had a chance to read the Ernst & Young Outlook on the UK solar PV industry which points to grid parity for PV here in the UK without any subsidy by 2020? It will happen well before that in Germany as a direct consequence of the far-sighted decisions they took many years ago.

Germany plans to generate 50% of its daytime electricity from solar by 2020 – with installed capacity of 52 gigawatts (GW). Despite the fact that solar PV has the potential to meet more than 30% of the UK's day-time electricity by 2040, our target for 2020 is just 2.7GW – not much more than the 2GW that Germany installed in June 2010 alone.

It's still not too late for the UK. But Monbiot has become a big part of the problem. His inability (or unwillingness) to track solar cost trends has fixed him in a weird contrarian crusade to undermine the solar industry.

Can nuclear and renewables not co-exist?

For me, there are four main reasons why co-existence has become a foolish pipedream.

1) The lobbying position of the nuclear industry itself

Until the middle of 2009, the nuclear industry's public position was a "both/and" position – with room for both renewables and nuclear. Since then, however, nuclear industry leaders have become increasingly vocal in arguing that if the UK government persists with its target of generating 15% of energy from renewables by 2020 (which means at least 35% of our electricity from renewables), then the nuclear industry will suffer very severely.

Both EDF and E-ON are on the record in making this case with growing stridency. And I'm sure Monbiot's sources inside Decc will have told him in no uncertain terms that what these companies say in public is a pale shadow of the virulently anti-renewables lobbying that they're doing behind the scenes. How else could EDF hope to recoup the £12bn it's already laid out to purchase nuclear sites here in the UK?

2) Financial opportunity costs

Nuclear power is the most capital-intensive of all supply options. With estimates ranging from £4bn to £5.5bn for a new nuclear reactor, there is a clear risk that other options will be frozen out by this level of capital commitment.

There will also be significant opportunity costs regarding energy efficiency – as well as renewables. Every billion that goes back to the nuclear industry is a billion that isn't going into retro-fitting our hopelessly inefficient housing stock – and simultaneously sorting out the continuing scandal of extraordinarily high levels of fuel poverty here in the UK.

Sometimes Monbiot is naive. Does he really think a "both/and" world is available when the Treasury is imposing a ruthless cap both on direct payments from tax revenues and on levies taken from consumer bills?

3) Political opportunity costs

The Sustainable Development Commission's 2006 report commented specifically on this:

"Were it to be decided to proceed with a new reactor programme, there is no doubt that this decision would command a substantial slice of political leadership. Political attention would shift, and in all likelihood undermine efforts to pursue a strategy based on energy efficiency, renewables and more CHP."

The electricity market reforms announced recently provide ample evidence to that effect. Our entire electricity market system is now being rigged to provide a wholly unjustifiable continuing subsidy to the nuclear industry, while doing a lot less than is required to promote renewables and absolutely nothing to put efficiency at the heart of that reform process.

4) Constraints in upgrading the grid

More and more industry specialists are concerned about what is sometimes called a "system clash" between a generation system based predominantly on a small number of nuclear reactors and large-scale gas or coal-fired power stations, and a system based on multiple renewable generators and more distributed local area networks. Greenpeace's report (The Battle of the Grids) eloquently highlights just how problematic this already is in Europe, where it has become commonplace in a number of countries to switch off wind turbines during periods of plentiful electricity supply in order to give priority to nuclear and coal-fired plant.

The high-capital costs and the nature of nuclear reactors means you need to run them all the time for both economic and engineering reasons. If there are 16 GW of new nuclear, as the government proposes, preference will clearly be given to purchasing from this source.

In conclusion, Monbiot should know better than to take the nuclear industry's "both/and" rhetoric at face value. Indeed, I sometimes wonder if he reads his own words as carefully as others do: "Power corrupts; nuclear power corrupts absolutely … nuclear operators worldwide have been repeatedly exposed as a bunch of arm-twisting, corner-cutting scumbags." That's powerful posturing. It's as if he's trying to cover up his own embarrassment at ending up as a pawn of the nuclear industry by being ruder about them (on a personal basis) than any anti-nuclear activist would think of being. I hope that strategy works for him; it certainly doesn't for me.

Are renewables always better?

I believe the answer to that question, today, is a clear "yes". I cannot guess what the situation might be in the future, and I've always supported the continuation of research into new nuclear technologies. It is indeed conceivable that at some stage in the future new reactor designs could prove to be so superior that we would be mad not to take advantage of such breakthroughs in the supply mix. We should continue to keep that door open.

However, I've heard so many promises of "better things to come" from the nuclear industry over the past 40 years that I attach very little significance to the current wave of similar promises.

Right now (and for at least the next decade I would argue) proven renewable technologies offer a much more secure supply-side strategy.

Monbiot knows as well as I do that 100% renewables (and geothermal) is where we need to get to eventually – so why not seek to get there just as soon as possible without yet another disastrous foray into today's nuclear cul-de-sac?

There are two other reasons for always favouring renewables over nuclear. It seems to me to be all-but-inevitable that there will be attempts at a terrorist attack on some nuclear facility somewhere in the world at some stage over the next decade. Secondly, and very briefly, we have to address the issue of proliferation. As Tom Burke has put it: "Atoms cannot be made to work for peace without making them available for war".

If you are to exclude nuclear entirely, what should the mix of electricity generation in this country be?

As Monbiot is aware, there are a growing number of voices arguing that we can indeed provide almost all the energy we need from renewable resources. The report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (adopted by 194 governments on 9th May 2011) shows how we could get up to 80% of the energy we need from renewable energy sources.

So my "vision" of a sustainable energy future for the UK is relatively simple. I believe a 100% renewable supply strategy for the UK is feasible by 2050 at the latest, assuming only that we succeed in reducing total energy consumption in the UK by at least 40% by 2030 through a wholly different approach to energy efficiency than any government has ever demonstrated before.

Andrew Warren, chief executive of the Association for Conservation of Energy, continues to highlight the contrast between the UK, which is anticipating a doubling in electricity demand, and Germany, which has a target to reduce total consumption by at least 30% – in an economy that is already much more energy efficient than ours.

But I readily acknowledge that this combination of renewables and efficiency will take some time to deliver. There will need to be some "generating bridge" to get us to that 2050 point. For me, this comes down to a straight choice between his "least worst option", namely nuclear, and my "least worst option", gas plus carbon capture and storage (CCS). Both nuclear and CCS are hugely expensive, and CCS is still unproven at scale. But we're almost certainly going to need CCS anyway (installed even on biomass plants) given the speed at which greenhouse gases continue to build up in the atmosphere. And at least gas is relatively cheap, relatively easily available, and relatively easy to build. Gas-powered stations built over the next five to 10 years could be economically retired from 2035 onwards.

In conclusion, I've answered Monbiot's four questions, even though they're not necessarily the most important questions. I've not even touched on those issues that matter most to the many people that remain hostile to or sceptical about nuclear power: radiation risk, radioactive waste management, fuel supply and manufacture, decommissioning, coastal siting, water availability, flooding and so on.

And nor have I raised any of the ethical issues associated with our generation opting for another round of nuclear. A proportion both of the risks and of the costs associated with this industry will fall on citizens who were not party to these decisions. For me, there is no way that this can possibly pass the "intergenerational justice" test.

I've come to the conclusion that Monbiot's controversialist instincts have blinded him, in this instance, to the inadequacy of his research, the untrustworthiness of his sources and the potentially damaging consequences of his bizarre pro-nuclear advocacy. Monbiot has caused many in the nuclear industry (and in government) to delight in his "Damascene conversion", an unexpected turn of events that they are already ruthlessly exploiting. All this might be seen as an acceptable price to pay if he had a solid case to make – which he transparently does not.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2011/jul/26/george-monbiot-renewable-nuclear

Recession Study Finds Hispanics Hit the Hardest

Vanessa Vick for The New York Times

A taco restaurant owned by Armando Moya, a Mexican immigrant, in Woodbridge, Va., outside Washington. He opened it in 2005, the same year he bought a house, which he has had to sell.


WOODBRIDGE, Va. — Hispanic families accounted for the largest single decline in wealth of any ethnic and racial group in the country during the recession, according to a study published Tuesday by the Pew Foundation.
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The study, which used data collected by the Census Bureau, found that the median wealth of Hispanic households fell by 66 percent from 2005 to 2009. By contrast, the median wealth of whites fell by just 16 percent over the same period. African Americans saw their wealth drop by 53 percent. Asians also saw a big decline, with household wealth dropping 54 percent.

The declines have led to the largest wealth disparities in the 25 years that the bureau has been collecting the data, according to the report.

Median wealth of whites is now 20 times that of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households, double the already marked disparities that had prevailed in the decades before the recent recession, the study found.

“It’s a very stark reminder of the high share of minorities who live at the economic margins of this country,” said Paul Taylor, executive vice president of the Pew Research Center and an author of the report. “These data really show their economic vulnerability.”

Household wealth, also referred to in the report as net worth, is made up of assets, like a house, a car, savings and stocks, minus debts, like mortgages, car loans and credit cards. It is tracked by the Census Bureau in the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a broad sampling of household wealth by race and ethnicity.

Nearly two-thirds of Hispanics’ median net worth in 2005 came from home equity, according to the report, and when the housing market collapsed, so did their wealth. Median home equity for Hispanics fell by 51 percent in the period of the survey. The drop was compounded by the fact that Hispanics tended to live in the places that were hit hardest in the recession, like Florida and California, the report said.

Armando Moya, a Mexican immigrant from Woodbridge, outside Washington, experienced these swings of fortune first-hand. For a few happy years, he believed he had avoided his father’s fate of scraping by. He bought a house with a backyard and opened a taco restaurant with his brothers. His bank account was growing, and he took his family on vacations several times a year.

Mr. Moya lives in Prince William County, where the Hispanic population more than tripled from 2000 to 2010, according to the Migration Policy Institute, with many newcomers working in construction trades that were flourishing in the rapidly growing suburbs of Washington.

To capitalize on the influx, Mr. Moya, who is now 38 and had been working in restaurants since he came to the United States in the early 1990s, decided to start his own, and together with his brother opened Ricos Tacos Moya in 2005.

In the same year, he bought a house valued at $350,000. His monthly payments were more than $2,300, and with hungry workers filling his restaurant, he managed.

But when the collapse of the housing market swept like a wave through this Northern Virginia county, taking his house, and his bank account, and many of his customers along with it, he lost his middle-class lifestyle.

“Everything was going down,” he said.

Now he is back where he started, living with his family in a rented apartment, and working seven days a week in the taco restaurant. His house sold for $135,000 to a couple from Morocco, he said.

“My money changed,” he said. “I lost my house.”

The share of Americans with no wealth at all rose sharply during the recession. A third of Hispanics had zero or negative net worth in 2009, up from 23 percent in 2005. For blacks, the portion rose to 35 percent from 29 percent, and for whites, it rose to 15 percent from 11 percent.

About a quarter of all black and Hispanic households owned nothing but a car in 2009. Just 6 percent of whites and 8 percent of Asians were in that situation.

Whites were less affected by the crisis, largely because their wealth flowed from assets other than housing, like stocks. A third of whites owned stocks and mutual funds in 2005, compared with 8 percent of Hispanics and 9 percent of blacks.

The median value of stocks and mutual funds owned by whites dropped by 9 percent from 2005 to 2009. In comparison, the median value of holdings for those blacks who held stocks dropped by 71 percent, most likely because they had to sell when prices were low, Mr. Taylor said.

The median wealth of Hispanic and black households is at its lowest point since 1984, when the Census Bureau first conducted the study, the report said.

Mr. Moya counts himself lucky to still have his restaurant. He has to work weekends at a nightclub in Washington to keep up with his rent. His life is increasingly resembling his father’s — subsisting, without saving — but he has pinned his hopes for a better life on his sons, and he has discarded the idea of returning to Mexico.

“I want my house back,” he said. “I’m working for my house right now.”

George Soros to close hedge fund management group to outside investors

• Soros Fund Management to hand back $1bn to investors
• Quantum fund hit by new SEC rules


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  • George Soros
    George Soros is to close his fund management company to outside investors. Photograph: Jorge Silva/Reuters

    George Soros, the man who broke the Bank of England, has shut up shop. The billionaire hedge fund manager's firm is handing back $1bn to clients and has told them it plans to stop managing money for outside investors.

    Soros, who turns 81 next month, became world famous after making millions betting that the UK would be forced to devalue the pound during the 1992 Black Wednesday currency crisis. More recently, he has become a philanthropist and social activist, pouring billions into causes including the promotion of democracy in eastern Europe and Africa, and ending the "war on drugs". He now intends to manage his own money but will no longer run investment funds.

    "We wish to express our gratitude to those who chose to invest their capital with Soros Fund Management LLC over the last nearly 40 years," Soros's sons Jonathan and Robert, who are co-deputy chairmen of the investment firm, wrote in a letter to investors. "We trust that you have felt well rewarded for your decision."

    They added that Keith Anderson, chief investment officer, would be leaving the firm, which has mostly overseen family assets since 2000.

    Soros's sons said they took the decision to close to outside investors because of new financial regulations that would have made it necessary to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the US financial watchdog, by March 2012 if the firm had continued to manage money for outsiders.

    Under the new rules, hedge funds with more than $150m (£90m) in assets must report information about their investors and the assets they manage, including potential conflicts of interest.

    "We have relied until now on other exemptions from registration which allowed outside shareholders whose interests aligned with those of the family investors to remain invested in Quantum," the executives said in the letter, referring to Soros's flagship Quantum Endowment fund. "As those other exemptions are no longer available under the new regulations, Soros Fund Management will now complete the transition to a family office that it began 11 years ago."

    Soros was born Dzjchdzhe Shorash in Budapest in 1930. After the Nazis invaded the city in 1944, his father arranged for false papers for family and friends that identified them as non-Jews.

    "Instead of submitting to our fate we resisted an evil force that was much stronger than we were – yet we prevailed. Not only did we survive, but we managed to help others," he wrote in an essay in the New York Review of Books recently. He said the experience had given him an appetite for risk: "This left a lasting mark on me, turning a disaster of unthinkable proportions into an exhilarating adventure."

    Soros emigrated to the UK in 1947 and started his career studying at the London School of Economics, moving to the US in 1956. In 1970 he and his business partner Jim Rogers opened Soros Fund Management. The pair proved to be outstanding investors. In 2010 Forbes listed Soros as the 35th richest man in the world, with an estimated fortune of $14.2bn.

    Soros controls more than $24.5bn for himself, his family and his foundations. "Markets are constantly in a state of uncertainty and flux, and money is made by discounting the obvious and betting on the unexpected," he once wrote.

    The Soros funds have been good long-term performers, returning about 20% a year on average since 1969. Recently the Quantum fund has underperformed, reportedly losing 6% in the first half of the year.

    Robert Slater, Soros's biographer, told the Bloomberg news agency that he expected Soros to remain an active investor. He said Soros had made the move to protect the identities of his investors. "He's still going to have a $25bn hedge fund," said Slater.

A new wave of factory closures threatened in China

By John Chan
26 July 2011

The closure of two major plants in Dongguan—one of the key manufacturing hubs in southern China—is a sign that the government’s credit tightening policy to curb rampant real estate speculation is unexpectedly threatening a new round of factory closures.

The shutdown of the South Korean-owned Dongguan Soyea Toys in mid-July, one of the oldest toy factories in Dongguan, was a shock for Beijing. Soyea had been operating since 1992 and was a supplier to major American retailers. It went bankrupt, however, as export orders fell amid rising costs for inputs.

A major textile company, Dingjia, in the same city, closed in June, leaving 2,000 workers without a job. In both cases, the factory owners fled, leaving debts to suppliers and unpaid wages of millions of dollars.

Soyea left 470 workers with their wages for June and first half of July, unpaid. More than 200 workers gathered at the gates of the municipal government compound last Tuesday in protest. Workers demanded the authorities intervene to obtain their wages of around one million yuan ($US154,000).

Chinese economic commentators have compared the Soyea and Dingjia closures to those of the Hejun toy plants in Dongguan in 2008, which signalled the beginning of a wave of factory closures. In the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis, more than 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs, mainly in China’s export industries.

Chen Yaohua, director of Dongguan’s textile and garment industry association, told the official Xinhua news agency that 10 percent of textile companies in Dongguan were now under financial pressure. Hong Kong Small and Medium Enterprises Association chairman Lau Tat-pong pointed particularly to the 18.6 percent rise in the minimum wage in Guangdong in March.

Fears about the manufacturing industry were further underscored by HSBC’s flash purchasing managers’ index (PMI) for China. It fell to 48.9 in July—the lowest figure in 28 months. A PMI reading below 50 represents a contraction in manufacturing activities. The Shanghai stock market tumbled 1 percent last Thursday on the news.

Zhu Hongren, spokesman for the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, acknowledged last week that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) faced serious financing difficulties as Beijing tightened liquidity, but dismissed warnings of a wave of bankruptcies.

In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, export companies were hit not only by a collapse of foreign orders, but a global credit squeeze that spread to China. Many foreign companies were unable to pay for their orders on time, causing a cash flow crisis for manufacturers, who in turn were unable to pay wages and suppliers. Factory closures swept the country.

Now a new form of credit crunch has affected the export industries. The government has lifted interest rates five times since October and imposed a number of restrictions on bank lending.

A recent survey of 17 provinces submitted to the State Council by the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce warned that the problems of survival among medium and small enterprises “have surpassed those of 2008.”

While the survey has not yet been made public, a source within the business association told 21st Century Business Herald that 90 percent of SMEs were unable to get bank loans, or were lucky to obtain loans with monthly interest rates of 20-30 percent. Underground lenders charged monthly rates of up to 50 percent. The source explained that in 2008, while the external demand had fallen sharply, the domestic credit environment had been loose. “But the current situation facing businesses is that external demand has not truly recovered, and so the banks’ credit tightening gravely threatens the cash flow of the vast majority of SMEs.”

The re-emerging crisis of small and medium firms, which employ the bulk of China’s workforce, is another symptom of the deepening turmoil facing Chinese capitalism.

In order to placate tens of millions of workers and to head off unrest, Beijing introduced a Labour Contract Law in 2007 that required employers to contribute to superannuation and provide permanent positions after 10 years of work. These extremely limited labour reforms have undermined many firms, which have also been forced to pay higher wages after a wave of strikes initiated by Honda auto workers in 2010.

Wages have been eroded by inflation, however, and many smaller firms are unable to attract rural migrant workers. In Guangdong province, the current minimum monthly wage is 1,300 yuan ($US200) a month, but even this meagre pay is now considered too high, compared to say Vietnam, where the wage is just $40 a month.

Transnational corporations have refused to pay more for goods made by low-end contractors in China—mainly owned by Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean and Japanese capitalists. In turn, these contractors have to scale down operations and shed workers, or relocate to inland provinces or even to Vietnam and Cambodia, where labour is cheaper. Above all, they have to intensify the rate of exploitation with longer hours and higher productivity.

An investigative report published last week by the US-based China Labour Watch examined ten electronics sweatshops making products for Apple, Dell, Sony and other international corporations. It found that employees were forced to work as much as 40 hours overtime a week, and were paid wages so low that they could not afford basic living costs.

The report explained how Chinese-based manufacturers, such as Taiwanese-owned Foxconn, were squeezed. It noted that the retail price for an iPhone in 2010 was $600, but after subtracting the costs of components of $187.50, Apple paid just $6.45 to Foxconn. The component and production costs were fixed. “Therefore it [Foxconn] can only profit from the price difference between its assembly revenue and the cost of workers’ salaries, thus introducing great incentives for factory management to pay workers as little as possible.”

Foxconn, which employs a million workers in China, recorded a net loss of $218.3 million last year due to falling global electronic sales. The suicide of 14 young workers last year highlighted Foxconn’s atrocious conditions. At least three more workers killed themselves this year, with the latest death occurring last Monday in the company’s Shenzhen complex. In May, an explosion at Foxconn’s Chongqing plant, which manufactures Apple iPads, killed three workers.

Rising unemployment produced by any large-scale factory closures in China, on top of the intensifying exploitation of workers, will vastly exacerbate social tensions in China and inevitably unleash an explosion of working class discontent.



US imperialism and the South China Sea crisis

26 July 2011

The Obama administration’s aggressive drive to counter China’s growing strategic and military influence in East Asia has seen the South China Sea become one of the globe’s most dangerous flashpoints.

Washington has made a series of provocative statements over the disputed waters. The latest was an address by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Saturday at an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) regional forum in Indonesia. She declared that the US was “a Pacific nation and resident power” and had a “national interest in open access to Asia’s maritime domain.”

This echoed Clinton’s comments during last year’s ASEAN regional forum in Vietnam, where she said that the US had a “national interest” in the South China Sea and “was back in Asia to stay.” Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi called Clinton’s remarks “virtually an attack on China.”

Clinton’s latest remark follows a series of inflammatory statements by US officials. Last month the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution backing “the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea.” On July 14, senators John McCain and John Kerry wrote to Dai Bingguo, China’s top foreign policy official, warning that Beijing’s conduct could “jeopardise the vital national interests of the United States.”

The series of incidents in the South China Sea this year—including confrontations between Chinese and Filipino naval vessels—is the direct result of the Obama administration’s aggressive push to get “back into Asia.” Washington is inflaming long-standing, previously localised border disputes between China, Vietnam and the Philippines. This is driving an arms race throughout Southeast Asia that will inevitably be paid for through the further undermining of working people’s living standards in the region as well as in the US itself.

The South China Sea contains rich oil and gas reserves and some of the world’s most geostrategically vital naval routes.

Beijing’s dependence on foreign energy sources is rapidly escalating. It imported 239 million tonnes of oil last year—17.5 percent more than in 2009—and regards the South China Sea as a potential new source of domestic production. A recent article in China’s state-run Daily Times described the South China Sea as a “second Persian Gulf.”

The South China Sea is also the key passageway for China’s energy imports. About 80 percent of all oil brought into China crosses the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa, entering the South China Sea via the Straits of Malacca. Other Asian economies, including Japan and South Korea, are similarly dependent on the daily passage of oil tankers through the South China Sea, making the naval route a key strategic choke point.

Washington has dominated many of the world’s most critical sea-lanes since 1945, including the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. This state of affairs is no longer tenable for Beijing. Chinese ruling circles are acutely conscious of the active discussions in ruling circles in the US and Europe of potentially threatening China with an energy blockade in the Indian Ocean.

This makes the South China Sea’s oil reserves—which are closer to Chinese territory and easier for China to protect—all the more valuable to Beijing. It is moving to develop a blue-water naval force capable of guarding its trade routes and international investments. Among its main priorities is securing the sea all the way from China’s coast to what Chinese strategists refer to as China’s “first island chain.” This area encompasses the Yellow Sea and East China Sea to the north, the Taiwan Strait to the east, and the South China Sea to the south.

This brings it into conflict with US imperialism, which since the end of World War II has sought to control the entire Pacific Ocean, up to China’s eastern coastline. In the final years of the Bush presidency, important sections of the foreign policy establishment were sharply critical of the administration for devoting too much attention to the Middle East and not enough to China and East Asia. The Obama administration has overseen a definite shift, making repeated statements that the US is “back in Asia,” reflecting a determination to maintain the post-1945 status quo in the Pacific.

The decline of American capitalism and the outbreak of the global economic crisis are undermining the economic foundations of the region and threaten to shift the global balance of forces. The US is the epicentre of the global economic breakdown triggered by the financial crash, and the crisis has exposed the contradictions that underlay the previous period of economic growth. These included the influx of Chinese credit, via the purchase of hundreds of billions of dollars of Treasury bonds, to finance cash-strapped American consumers’ purchases of low-cost consumer goods produced by the super-exploited Asian proletariat.

Under these conditions Washington relies ever more openly on its military superiority to advance its strategic and economic interests. This is all the more reckless in that every government involved in the South China Sea dispute is being driven to divert mounting class antagonisms arising from the social and economic crisis along reactionary nationalist lines.

The situation in the South China Sea is fraught with danger. In one of the world’s busiest naval routes there are deepening military rivalries and no coordinated communications between the rival countries’ naval forces. The region is a tinder box, with innumerable possibilities for an accident or misunderstanding—or even a provocation—to trigger a clash that could escalate into a full-blown war between the US and China.

The international working class has to intervene and advance its own independent solution to the crisis. Working people and the rural poor in China and Southeast Asia have no stake in the rival territorial claims being issued by their governments. The task is to unite with the American and international working class in a joint struggle against US and world imperialism, the profit system, and the destructive division of the world into rival nation states, and for a rationally planned and democratically controlled world economy. This requires an uncompromising struggle against the Maoist ruling elite in China, the Stalinist elite in Vietnam, and the national bourgeoisie in the Philippines.

Patrick O’Connor


Jan de Vos: la canoa que llegó al mar

Artesano comprometido con la elaboración de una historia que sirva de herramienta para la recuperación de la dignidad de los pueblos indios, historiador riguroso e imaginativo, critico del poder, Jan de Vos falleció el pasado 24 de julio.

El autor de de Nuestra raíz nació en 1936 en Amberes, Bélgica, en el seno de una familia católica de nueve hermanos. Su lengua materna fue el flamenco. Creció en plena guerra mundial y vivió en una casa ocupada por el ejército alemán. Con el inicio de los bombardeos se trasladó al campo.

Asistió a un colegio de jesuitas y a los 17 años entró a una universidad francófona. Durante dos años estudió historia y derecho. A los 19, influido por un maestro al que admiraba, entró a la vida religiosa. Terminó la carrera de historia y se siguió con las de filosofía y teología.

Sus primeros años de vida profesional se desempeñó como profesor en colegios jesuitas, hasta que se cuestionó dedicarse a educar a los hijos del príncipe y chocó con una vida académica gris. En 1973 se trasladó a Colombia a realizar trabajo pastoral. Vivió, primero, en un barrio pobre en la ciudad de Medellín, y luego en un pueblo de campesinos y pescadores negros y mulatos, descendientes de esclavos, en la zona selvática. Se enamoró de la población afrodescendiente, de la selva tropical, del océano Pacífico y de las hamacas, que le recordaban con su movimiento el útero materno.

La experiencia colombiana lo marcó para siempre. En 1973 se fue a vivir a Chiapas, donde colaboró con la diócesis de San Cristóbal, dirigida por don Samuel Ruiz. Un año antes se había publicado el libro de Gustavo Gutiérrez sobre la Teología de la Liberación. En 1974 se realizó en la entidad el Congreso Indígena, momento nodal en la reconstitución de los pueblos originarios en el estado.

Jan de Vos hizo trabajo pastoral en la entidad, vinculado al proyecto Los indígenas merecen ser sujetos de su propia historia. Fue comisionado para colaborar en la reconstrucción de la historia indígena regional. Atendió los servicios religiosos de la parroquia de San José Obrero, una modesta ermita en San Cristóbal. Como oficiaba cantando y tocando la guitarra, se corrió el rumor de que era protestante.

Su primer escrito fue un ensayo sobre fray Lorenzo de la Nada, el dominico que el siglo XVII chocó con la jerarquía religiosa y huyó a la selva para vivir con los indios. Con paciencia y fortuna, De Vos siguió sus huellas y se identificó con su actitud vital.

En 1981 y 1982 las autoridades gubernamentales lo quisieron detener y expulsar del país por su compromiso con los indígenas, por lo que dejó el convento de Chilón. Tuvo entonces que dedicarse al trabajo escolar en la Universidad Iberoamericana. Su interés en ser historiador surgió así del fracaso de su vocación inicial como agente de pastoral. Nunca fue un historiador académico tradicional.

En 1986, a los 50 años de edad, tomó la difícil decisión de abandonar la Compañía de Jesús, tanto por razones personales como institucionales. Un factor central en su ruptura con la jerarquía religiosa fue su incomodidad con la clericalización de la institución. Tuvo entonces que dejar su trabajo de investigador del CIES.

Jan de Vos hablaba flamenco, francés, alemán, inglés y español. Leía, además, griego y latín. En su formación influyó decisivamente la obra de Hegel, especialmente el capítulo sobre La conciencia infeliz de La fenomenología del espíritu y la dialéctica del amo y el esclavo. La temprana lectura de la novela La vida sencilla, de Wiechert Ernst, lo marcó para siempre y lo inspiró para alejarse del poder.

En sentido estricto, como historiador no tuvo maestros. Admiró, sin embargo, la obra de Luis González y González y de Edmundo O’Gorman, de quien aprendió su posición crítica. Tuvo gran aprecio y respeto por la calidad intelectual y ética de Daniel Cosío Villegas.

Para explicar la utilidad de la historia, Jan de Vos la comparaba con la mujer que va a consulta con el sicoanalista. En las primeras sesiones, la señora parece decirse a sí misma que no entiende por qué está allí, pero conforme la terapia avanza, comienza a hablar sobre su niñez y juventud, y a comprender la relación que existe entre su pasado y su infelicidad actual. La señora –decía Jean– simboliza a la sociedad y la función del historiador es hacer la historia clínica del mal ahora existente, punto de partida para su solución.

El investigador definió su actividad como la de un sabicultor, y la comparó con el trabajo realizado por los campesinos: solitario, sostenido, paciente y amoroso. El conocimiento del pasado –sostuvo a propósito de los pueblos indios– es necesario para construir una identidad. Y, a su vez, la identidad es un elemento central para tener dignidad.

Jan de Vos es autor de una vasta colección de libros de historia de los pueblos indígenas de Chiapas, escritos con una prosa apasionada e intensa. Entre otros, destacan: La paz del dios y del rey: la conquista de la selva Lacandona, 1525-1821, Oro verde: la conquista de la selva Lacandona por los madereros tabasqueños, 1822-1949 y Una tierra para sembrar sueños: historia reciente de la selva Lacandona, 1950-2000.

En la redacción de muchos de sus libros utilizó textos de la tradición oral, que son, desde su punto de vista, la otra manera de recordar el pasado, la contraparte del esfuerzo individual de quien escribe la historia. En esos textos, el historiador encuentra la forma en que la comunidad recupera su pasado, a través de leyendas, mitos, cuentos, rezos y rituales, contados por gente dotada con el don de la narración.

En 1995 fue invitado por el EZLN para participar en la Mesa sobre Derechos y Cultura Indígenas. Para él fue una experiencia inolvidable. Orgulloso, encontró que varios de los comandantes rebeldes habían sido sus alumnos en el seminario. El zapatismo –dijo– permitió que los indígenas hicieran realidad un gran sueño: el de conseguir la dignidad que merecen.

Jan de Vos pensó su vida como una travesía rumbo al mar a bordo de diversas embarcaciones. Este 24 de julio, la canoa que conducía llegó al termino de su viaje, cargada con una obra única para comprender la historia de los pueblos indígenas de Chiapas.

Un abrazo a Emma Cosío Villegas.