China's rogue regimes play up

By Brian McCartan

BANGKOK - Arms shipments, cooperation on underground tunneling and a budding nuclear relationship between North Korea and Myanmar threatens to destabilize Southeast Asia's security balance and raise the ire of China, both countries' powerful neighbor and ally.

The global spotlight has focused on North Korean-Myanmar ties ever since a freighter, the Kang Nam 1, was reported to be steaming towards Myanmar with a suspected cargo of weapons in violation of a recent United Nations Security Council ban. The ban came in the wake of North Korea's ballistic missile test in April and an underground test the following month of a nuclear device. North Korea has promised to launch another ballistic missile test on July 4.

Myanmar severed diplomatic ties with Pyongyang in 1983 after three North Korean agents bombed the mausoleum of Myanmar's revered independence leader Aung San and killed 18 visiting South Korean officials, including then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chan and three other cabinet ministers. However, trade continued between the two isolated authoritarian regimes and clandestine military ties are known to have been re-established in 1999. Diplomatic relations were publicly restored in 2007.

The nature of those military-to-military ties is now a matter of growing international conjecture and concern. Several unexplained visits to Myanmar by North Korean freighters have also been reported in recent years, and the secrecy and heavy security surrounding the ships has led many analysts to believe that they consisted of weapons shipments.

The slow voyage of the Kang Nam 1 since leaving Wimpo on North Korea's western coast has sparked speculation that it may be packed with parts for short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or even the missiles themselves. Opposition sources claim that Myanmar's military government, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), may have already acquired Scud-type missiles or is testing its own designs with technical help from North Korean advisors.

Asia Times Online was not able to independently corroborate those claims at the time of publication. But Myanmar's interest in the weapons seems to be partially confirmed by recent photos published in The Irrawaddy news magazine of chief of staff and SPDC Number 3 General Thura Shwe Mann and his entourage inspecting a Scud production facility during a November visit to North Korea.

Further evidence may have emerged on Monday when three Japanese executives were arrested in Tokyo for allegedly trying to sell a magnetic measuring device to Myanmar. The device, which can be used in the production of ballistic missiles, was reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun as being ordered by the Hong Kong-based New East International Trading Ltd, which it said was linked to the North Korean Second Economic Committee of the Pyongyang Workers' Party. The same company reportedly tried and failed last year to export to Myanmar a similar measuring device when it was found to have failed to obtain a proper export application for the sale.

A major purchase by Myanmar of North Korean-made 130mm M46 field guns was made in 1999. North Korean C-801 "Eagle Strike" anti-ship cruise missiles were obtained before July 2006, intended for mounting on several of Myanmar's patrol vessels. Insurgent military commanders say Myanmar also acquired last year truck-mounted 107mm or 122mm multiple rocket launcher systems from North Korea through Singapore.

North Korean involvement in the construction of large-scale underground tunnel and bunker networks across Myanmar was confirmed earlier this month when Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner published exclusive photos of the tunnels, including what are believed to be North Korean technicians and advisors on the site. The Irrawaddy later published additional photos of the tunnel complexes last week. The tunnels are believed to be defenses for a possible US-led invasion.

Nuclear nexus
More worrying to regional governments is mounting evidence of Pyongyang's involvement in Myanmar's revitalized nuclear program. Myanmar's government restarted its program in May 2007 through an agreement with Russia to provide assistance and build a nuclear research center and 10 megawatt reactor. Although the planned reactor will use non-weapons grade uranium, training associated with the facility could eventually be turned to develop nuclear weapons, experts say. They note that North Korea developed its runaway nuclear program from a similar reactor at Yongbyon.

Opposition groups claim that North Korean technicians are either involved in the Russian reactor program or building a separate reactor. Asia Times Online could not independently confirm either claim. But Pyongyang's duplicity in its own nuclear program and its recent show of contempt for world opinion by conducting ballistic missile and nuclear tests, combined with past efforts to export nuclear technology to Syria and Iran, have raised widespread concerns.

So, too, does Myanmar's past record of allegedly using weapons of mass destruction. Myanmar has been widely accused by international human rights groups and ethnic insurgents of carrying out clandestine chemical weapons production in the 1980s and of using those weapons, and possibly biological weapons, in the early 1990s against ethnic insurgent groups.

While experts agree that Myanmar, even with established nuclear facilities, would not be able to produce a nuclear-grade weapon for years, Pyongyang's willingness to export technology and know-how to other reclusive, anti-Western regimes will raise substantially the regional security temperature and has the potential to spark a new Southeast Asian arms race.

It's not clear that that's a case scenario China, Myanmar's main international patron, would favor. China has spent considerable effort in developing Myanmar as a source of cheap natural resources to supply its growing industrial base, as a trade gateway to its remote and landlocked southwestern region and as a soon-to-be strategic conduit for oil and gas shipments from the Middle East.

Work is slated to begin in September on an oil and gas pipeline that will carry 20 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of gas every year across Myanmar to the southwestern city of Kunming. The proposed pipeline will allow Chinese oil rigs to bypass the narrow Malacca Straits, where over 80% of its current fuel imports pass and viewed as a potential strategic chokepoint in any conflict with the US.

The last thing China would want, say experts, is to see these new commercial arteries compromised by US concerns over a nuclear Myanmar. After withdrawing support for the Burmese Communist Party in the late 1980s, China has in varying degrees propped up Myanmar's military regime. Beijing's support has included massive arms shipments that allowed the generals to rapidly expand their military to an estimated 500,000 standing soldiers in the decade after crushing pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988.
China's influence has also been instrumental in deflecting criticism of Myanmar in international fora, including at the United Nation's Security Council. It has also since the 1980s spent considerable effort and money making economic inroads and securing lucrative concessions over Myanmar's rich natural resources, including timber, gold, copper and agribusiness interests for Chinese companies.

Even before the Kang Nam 1 controversy, there were subtle signs of China's mounting annoyance with North Korea's and Myanmar's brinksmanship towards the West. Australian Myanmar expert Andrew Selth wrote in a 2007 paper, "Beijing has also demonstrated a degree of nervousness over Pyongyang's own rather erratic and aggressive policies."

"Despite some suggestions to the contrary, a closer relationship between two pariah states [North Korea and Myanmar] on China's borders would not be seen as a strategic asset. China may even resent Pyongyang's interference in what until now has been considered by some a Chinese sphere of interest," Selth wrote.

That assumed concern would no doubt grow if Myanmar were to acquire SRBM's or a nuclear-grade weapon. According to Selth, "Beijing is unlikely to be happy about the prospect of the SPDC acquiring a nuclear weapon, given [Myanmar's] proximity to China, its internal instability and the unpredictable behavior of its leaders."

Tacit tolerance
China has so far tolerated North Korean conventional weapons shipments and links to supplying ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Syria and Iran, regimes considered unsavory by the wider international community. That tacit support has included the transit of Chinese airspace by North Korean aircraft carrying suspicious cargos. For instance, a North Korean Illyushin-62 cargo aircraft was stopped last year from proceeding to Iran from the northern Myanmar city of Mandalay with an unidentified cargo when Indian authorities declined to grant it over-flight rights. The North Korean aircraft could only have reached Myanmar through Chinese airspace, experts say.

Chinese goodwill, however, may be stretched by having that same technology shared with its nearby neighbors, particularly if it sours ties with greater Southeast Asia, where it has recently dedicated considerable diplomatic and commercial energies in a so-called "soft power" campaign. Selth speculates in his paper that China would unlikely grant North Korea permission to use its airspace to send SRBMs or nuclear components to Myanmar.

Beijing's resistance to international attempts to censure both North Korea and Myanmar are based on its own perceptions of national interest and security that often run counter to Western views. Beijing has opposed international sanctions against North Korea exactly because if they succeeded in toppling the regime it would cause an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and a possible presence of US troops allied to South Korea stationed on its border.

Chinese support for sanctions against Myanmar would potentially have a similar destabilizing effect, as competing political factions and ethnic insurgent groups battled in a power vacuum for territory and autonomy. Beijing is already involved in mediating between the SPDC and ethnic insurgent armies on the China-Myanmar border, in a bid to stop hostilities from spiraling into all-out war along its southern border.

Maintaining regional stability is also a paramount Chinese concern. Myanmar's possession of ballistic missiles or a nuclear capability would risk the spread of weapons of mass destruction technologies in a region where no state has acquired nuclear weapons. A regional arms race would likely ensue as Myanmar's neighbors sought deterrence options.

As Selth wrote, "In this atmosphere of fear and suspicion, the security stakes in the region would go up, raising the prospect of other countries feeling obliged to expand their own inventories of strategic weapons. Beijing would also worry about the possible response of the US to closer [Myanmar]-North Korea ties."

The US has maintained economic sanctions against Myanmar's rights-abusing regime since 1997, measures which to date have hurt the broad population more than the ruling generals. If Myanmar were to acquire ballistic missiles and launch a secretive nuclear program, Washington would likely be forced to re-evaluate its Myanmar policy towards more direct engagement, as it has adopted with North Korea.

China has so far carefully chosen its words in official statements voicing concern about North Korea's recent actions. Beijing only agreed to the recent UN resolution against Pyongyang after signatories agreed to remove provisions which allowed for the use of force to enforce inspections. Despite that even-handed diplomatic stance, criticism of North Korea's actions has surged in China's state-controlled media and government-approved journals.

Terms that were previously unknown in state-sanctioned Chinese writing on North Korea, including "reckless", "ungrateful" and "security threat", have recently appeared in several news journals. The China Daily, regarded as the English-language mouthpiece of the government, last week wrote, "Compared with this sense of failure [of the six-party talks], many Chinese experts and advisors are more concerned with the threat of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons pose to China's security ... Such an attitude on the part of Pyongyang is a warning that China should reconsider its national interest."

Whether China is contemplating a substantive rethink of its North Korea policy is still a matter of conjecture. But North Korea's provocative move to send a ship known for transporting arms to Myanmar immediately after a nuclear test and in violation of a UN Security Council resolution could soon force China to take a harder look at both regional relationships.

China has become increasingly, if very subtly, critical of Myanmar's regime in recent years. The September 2007 armed crackdown on peaceful protestors caused even China to join a strongly worded statement by the UN Human Rights Council condemning the incident.

On several occasions, Myanmar's leadership has been told by senior Chinese government officials that Beijing would like to see increased efforts at national reconciliation. Myanmar expert Lintner told Asia Times Online that China had recently taken the unusual step of reproducing his reports that exposed North Korean assistance for tunneling in Myanmar in various Chinese language publications.

The Kang Nam 1 was reported on Thursday to have reversed course and headed back to North Korea, putting off for now the difficult question of how the international community intends to enforce the UN's weapons ban. The reason behind the course shift is unclear, but behind-the-scenes Chinese pressure cannot be ruled out.

Whatever the reason, the scrapped voyage has put global attention on Myanmar's nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, to a degree that China perhaps can no longer ignore.

Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.

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